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ABSTRACT 
A common challenge at nuclear power plants is to ensure 
that routinely-collected data is fully utilised. Data analytics 
provides an opportunity for improvements in prognostics and 
health monitoring by identifying correlations in related 
datasets without major capital investment. 
This paper describes work focused on improving the fuel 
defect identification process in Bruce Power’s eight CANDU 
nuclear reactors in the province of Ontario, Canada. The 
CANDU reactor comprises individually-pressurised 
horizontal channels which can be refuelled without taking the 
reactor offline. The detection and location of fuel defects is 
typically achieved using two systems: the first monitors the 
primary coolant for the presence of fission products and 
specific radionuclides, and is used to detect the presence of 
fuel defects within the core. The second system is deployed 
periodically and uses the emission of delayed neutrons to 
identify the channel containing defect fuel.   
In this paper we focus on improving the assessment of on-
line delayed neutron monitoring data, with the aim of reducing 
the time period between initial detection of an in-core defect 
to identification and removal of the damaged fuel.  The 
existing process is manually intensive, reliant on the 
judgement of a domain expert and operating experience 
demonstrates that this time period varies considerably.  
A first stage of investigation examines potential 
improvements to the current data processing system: 
developing and applying new analytic techniques in this area 
has shown promising results, with some fuel defects 
potentially identified several days earlier than the current 
system. Results from some short representative case studies 
are presented and further work will consider a larger volume 
of data. 
In addition, an extensive historical dataset is available 
which spans several years. In the second stage of investigation, 
the paper explores previously undocumented trends in this data 
and discusses the potential to produce correlations with other 
reactor parameters. The application of this knowledge can lead 
to opportunities in the use of Machine Learning algorithms to 
allow more accurate predictions to be made. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Data is constantly gathered at nuclear power plants, and is 
generally used to help engineers and operators make key 
decisions regarding specific plant operations. While operators 
will have a deep technical knowledge of the systems they are 
managing, there is often limited re-use or statistical analysis of 
data once it has served its initial purpose. As a result of 
advances in computer-driven machine learning which have not 
yet been fully leveraged in many operational areas, there exists 
an opportunity to improve the decision making process so that 
faults may be detected earlier, more accurately and with fewer 
dedicated personnel hours. These advances can also enable 
larger historical datasets to be leveraged, and combining this 
with novel analytics can lead to a deeper understanding of the 
core behaviour at little extra cost to plant operators. 
 
Here we present the initial assessment and analysis of data 
from one such area: that of delayed neutron monitoring for fuel 
defect detection in CANDU nuclear plants.  
2 BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. CANDU Reactors 
Bruce Power operates eight CANDU nuclear reactors in the 
province of Ontario, Canada. Fuel in the CANDU reactor is 
arranged in bundles, each containing 37 fuel elements, with 
12 bundles in each of the 480 pressure tubes.  One advantage 
of the design is that every fuel channel can be individually 
refuelled without taking the reactor offline. (Garland et al., 
2014). 
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2.2. Motivation for fuel monitoring  
Components within CANDU reactor cores are subject to high 
levels of stress due to a number of factors. The primary source 
of damage is the intensity of heat created in the fission 
process, but the heat fluctuation and high flow speed of the 
heavy water coolant are also major contributors. 
 
Fuel elements comprise a number of uranium oxide pellets 
contained within a thin zircalloy sheath. Ongoing exposure to 
fast neutrons causes embrittlement and weakness of this 
sheath. Upon refuelling, the coolant is allowed to carry the 
new fuel bundle into the reactor, resulting in unavoidable 
collisions between new and old fuel bundles, leading to 
another source of materials stress (Garland et al., 2014). 
 
As a result of the stresses the fuel is exposed to, defects can 
occasionally occur. The frequency of events such as these in 
CANDU reactors are some of the world’s lowest amongst 
water cooled reactors (IAEA, 2010), but it remains important 
that they are detected and removed quickly. 
 
When a fuel defect occurs, fission byproducts are able to 
escape into the coolant. Some of these byproducts have long 
half-lives and can cause long term contamination of the 
primary coolant loop, which has specific operating limits for 
radiation levels (AECL CANDU, 1993). Fuel bundles with 
multiple defects are more difficult to remove from the reactor, 
which further incentivises the identification and location of 
defects at an early stage. 
 
2.3. Fuel Monitoring Systems 
The detection and location of fuel defects in CANDU reactors 
is achieved on some sites using two systems: the first 
monitors the primary coolant for the presence of fission 
products and specific radionuclides and is used to indicate the 
presence of defect fuel somewhere within the core. The 
second system is deployed periodically and uses the emission 
of delayed neutrons (DNs) to identify the channel containing 
defect fuel. The data generated by this second system is the 
focus of the work presented here, but the information derived 
from the GFP system is useful when interpreting the DN data 
and will be referenced later. 
 
If a defect occurs, DNs are released and detectable in 
monitoring halls outside the reactor, predominantly via I137 
with half-life of 22 seconds and B87 with half-life of 56 
seconds (AECL CANDU, 1993). Inside the reactor, DNs from 
escaped fission products make up only approximately 3% of 
total activity, however a short time after leaving the core they 
account for 75% of DN activity due to the longer half-lives of 
these specific fission byproducts. As a result, it is possible to 
detect which channel contains a fuel defect by measuring 
neutron activity levels. 
 
The 480 channels are monitored via two measurement halls; 
one at each end of the reactor. Sample tubes for all 480 
channels are connected to either hall, designed in order to 
allow a transit time between reactor and measurement hall of 
45 seconds which allows the defect fuel to be identified as 
outlined above. Some differences may arise in this transit time 
figure due to system pressure deviations, pressure loss 
calculation errors for pipe fittings, and in-line coolant boiling. 
 
Measurement points for each of the 240 channels are arranged 
in an 8x30 array in each measurement hall. These 
measurement points are surrounded by tanks of demineralized 
water to ensure isolation of readings. A rig comprising 8 
neutron detectors moves horizontally across this array, 
stopping for a short period at each sample point to 
simultaneously collect 8 neutron count values; originally this 
period was one minute (Lipsett & Tseng, 1976) but was 
subsequently lengthened to 90 seconds. The collection of DN 
activity data for all 240 channels in a single session in a single 
hall is now referred to as a ‘scan’. 
 
After the coolant has passed through the measurement hall, it 
is returned to the reactor and recirculates. As a result, elevated 
DN readings are initially observed for just one channel but 
subsequently all channels will exhibit higher counts, although 
the channel containing defective fuel should continue to 
display the highest counts (AECL CANDU, 1993). 
 
2.4. Existing Analysis Process 
Bruce Power employs a Double Normalisation (2xN) 
technique to allow comparison and identification of the 
channel(s) with defective fuel. For each detector, count values 
are first filtered then normalized with respect to the average 
count rate for the 30 channels in question. This removes most 
effects of any settings changes between scans, and goes some 
way towards removing any inter-monitor bias, assuming all 
monitors are connected to similarly active channels. 
Secondly, data is filtered and normalized channelwise, so if 
one channel consistently produces a higher reading than 
others, this bias will be removed (Schmeing & Hogg, 2005).  
 
This algorithm is applied to every group of channels for all 8 
detectors, and by plotting these values any anomalous 
channels can be identified as their double normalized counts 
will usually appear to trend higher than their neighbours. Fig. 
1 shows an example of data from a group of channels, with 
the highlighted data series derived from a channel containing 
defect fuel. The channel selection process is challenging as 
the data has low resolution and high variance and operating 
experience using the existing 2xN system has demonstrated 
Fig. 1 A representative DN plot, with defect channel 
highlighted 
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that the time taken for the channel containing the fuel defect 
to become distinguishable from its neighbouring channels 
varies considerably. Greater clarity and repeatability in this 
area would be beneficial. 
 
Fuel defect detection in CANDU reactors has been the focus 
of some previous work. (MacDonald, Floyd, Lewis, Manzer, 
& Truant, 1990) summarised the current approach based on 
calculation and thresholding of a DN discrimination ratio, 
comparing count rates to background. The 2xN algorithm 
(Schmeing & Hogg, 2005) is a direct development of this 
method. Other work (Livingstone, 2012) has focussed on 
improved online decision support for the GFP system using 
physical understanding of the behaviour of specific 
radionuclides to more quickly identify anomalous reactor 
parameters. To the authors’ knowledge, no recent work has 
been undertaken to improve the DN time series analysis. 
3 GENERAL APPROACH 
The focus of this paper is on assessment of on-line DN 
monitoring data, with the aim of reducing the time taken 
between initial detection of an in-core defect to scheduling the 
channel for removal of the defect. The work is divided into two 
stages. In stage 1, an initial review of a data sample was 
undertaken and the potential for improvement in the existing 
defect localisation process was explored. In stage 2, a more 
extensive database was reviewed for bulk historical analysis, 
with the aim of visualising and identifying longer-term trends 
and any reactor data which may be relevant. This feature 
engineering process is an important step in the production of 
robust and explainable models. Fig. 2 outlines the development 
of this work. 
Fig. 2 General approach for the analysis of DN data 
The limited initial release of DN data referred to in Fig. 2 
covered several units at the Bruce Power site, for time periods 
around specific fuel defects of approximately one year. The 
full data release covered all 8 units, spanning various time 
periods up to 30 years. Currently, only very limited data 
regarding fuel defect detection and location dates is available 
to allow benchmarking and validation of the developed 
techniques.  
4 STAGE 1: IMPROVED DEFECT LOCALISATION 
Using a small representative set of data with labelled defects, 
preliminary assessments explored the application of 
alternative anomaly detection methods. For each method 
described in the following subsections, a series of graphs is 
displayed demonstrating the result of this specific analysis at 
various intervals approaching the time of defect localisation by 
the 2xN algorithm. We refer to this identification time point as 
‘D’.  
 
4.1. Change in Variance 
One approach was to calculate the variance of each channel 
from the point at which the GFP system identified an in-core 
fuel defect. This is shown visually in Fig. 3 for a batch of 30 
channels (corresponding to one monitor), where the vertical 
dotted line corresponds to GFP detection date. Variance is 
calculated for all channels for data immediately following this 
point.  
 
The results of the variance calculation are displayed 
graphically in Fig. 4. The defect-containing channel, 5th from 
left, has been highlighted.  It can clearly be seen that the 
variance in this channel is sufficiently distinguishable from the 
bulk response in the latter 2 scans.  Six further instances of 
defect fuel data have been examined and on average it has been 
shown that examining the variance can distinguish the channel 
containing the fuel defect 2-3 scans earlier than the 2xN 
system. 
Fig. 3 Variance calculation - stylised example  
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Fig. 4 Variance for all channels - results
4.2. Change in Mean 
Another approach quantified the change in mean of the count 
rate for each channel, before and after detection of a defect 
using the GFP system. Fig. 5 shows this approach graphically.  
 
Channels where the mean count rate decreased are dismissed 
on the basis that only an increased count is expected for a 
channel containing a defect.  
 
This method uses the assumption that on average, the count 
rate should increase for a channel containing a defect and so 
the comparison of the mean of two similar subsequences 
before and after the GFP detection date should mitigate some 
of the noise and highlight this discrepancy. The results for this 
technique are shown in Fig. 6.
 
a) D-4 scans b) D-3 scans 
c) D-2 scans d) D-1 scan 
Fig. 5 Change in mean calculation - stylised example  
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Fig. 6 Change in mean - results 
As with the variance calculation method demonstrated in 
section 4.1, the defect channel is also visible earlier than with 
the 2xN system. Other channels do also contain relatively 
large positive deviations, which could be caused if the count 
rates in these channels prior to GFP detection were atypically 
low, for example. It may be possible to optimise this further 
by adjusting the data window size pre-GFP detection or by 
looking further backwards to account for any more general 
trends occurring in other monitors. 
 
4.3. Cumulative Residuals 
On the basis that small differences from the mean behaviour 
may not be visible due to high levels of noise, it is proposed 
that the cumulative effect of these differences may be more 
obvious. With each new scan, the final method shown 
calculates an array of differences between the counts and the 
average count in the window since the GFP detection. The 
cumulative sum and total sum of these differences is then 
calculated, with the cumulative figures finally subtracted 
from the total. In this way the final value is always 0 (because 
the final cumulative sum = total sum) and any anomalously-
high counts will appear above the others when plotted 
graphically. 
 
A window starting at point of GFP detection could be 
analysed, with the exact starting point adjusted to optimise 
detection capability. As before, Fig. 7 displays a stylised 
example of this calculation process. 
Fig. 7 Stylised example showing cumulative residual 
calculation 
Fig. 8 displays the results of this calculation. Again, the fuel 
defect channel is distinguishable up to 3 scans before it is 
identified via the 2xN system. 
 
a) D-4 scans b) D-3 scans 
c) D-2 scans d) D-1 scan 
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Fig. 8 Cumulative Residuals
These early visualisations provided evidence that alternative 
approaches to the current analysis process were possible. 
Three methods have been presented here which show promise 
for identifying anomalous channels 2-3 scans earlier than with 
existing methods.  Further detailed analysis against other 
historical instances of defect fuel across different reactors is 
now underway in order to build a case for moving towards 
using one, or a combination, of these methods in conjunction 
with the existing double normalisation method. 
5 STAGE 2: BULK HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
As discussed earlier, on completion of an initial review of a 
smaller dataset a more detailed analysis can now be made. Stage 
2 of this work seeks to identify longer-term trends which can 
enable the incorporation of more sophisticated analytics tools. 
Based on the findings of the initial visualisations, a larger set of 
data was made available. Several years of data was parsed and 
extracted from the regular monitoring of 8 units. Feature 
information in a suitable archival form is currently limited but 
other trends of interest can nonetheless be identified. 
 
As a first step, the mean, median and standard deviation of the 
raw data was plotted as a time series to visualize any long term 
trends. This is shown for one unit in Fig. 9. Each point relates 
to the average, median or standard deviation of a complete 
scan for a single monitoring hall. Overall, there appears to be 
a tendency for average count rates to slowly reduce over time, 
with step changes following extended outages. Discussion 
with engineers indicates that the long-term downward trend 
may be due to the reduction of monitor sensitivity over time 
when exposed to neutron flux, and the step change potentially 
due to recalibration and cleaning of monitors. Similar trends 
are visible for most other units and investigations are ongoing. 
 
a) D-4 scans b) D-3 scans 
c) D-2 scans d) D-1 scan 
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Further insight can be gained by plotting this data as a heatmap 
for each measurement hall. An example is shown in Fig. 10, 
where every vertical slice corresponds to a single scan and 
every horizontal slice corresponds to a single channel of the 
240. In order to perform comparisons between different 
detectors, it is necessary to first normalise the count data. A 
standard scaling process was selected to produce a distribution 
with zero mean and unit standard deviation across the date axis 
for each monitor group, which allows identification of inherent 
activity differences between channels. The arrangement of the 
data is such that on the y-axis, channels are grouped by 
detector.  Within each detector band there is graduated 
distribution in the normalised count from low to high, as when 
the system was designed there was an attempt made to ensure 
even distribution of low and high power channels across each 
detector.  As with most reactor designs, central channels tend 
to have a higher associated power (and associated DN activity) 
than those on the periphery and this leads to 8 horizontally 
repeating patterns.  
 
Visualising the data in this manner for this particular unit has 
highlighted a clear, distinctly different response in one of the 
detectors: a number of anomalies are visible in the 6th 
horizontal band which indicates that this monitor has 
occasionally been causing spurious readings for several years. 
This is not a critical issue as errors are almost always obvious 
and can be quickly discarded but further investigation is 
ongoing with station engineers to determine the root cause of 
this behaviour.  
 
It is worth noting that both Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 display 
approximately six years of inspection data on a single graph in 
a way which is not normally visualised and this has identified 
some previously-unseen insightful trends.  
 
An important aspect of any analysis techniques developed is to 
ensure that there is an understanding of the underlying physical 
processes, which involved close discussion with engineers at 
Bruce Power. In this way, insight has been gained regarding the 
physical layout of the pipework connecting the reactor to 
measurement halls, as well as the difference in appearance of 
real defects compared with electronic errors. Specifically, real 
defects will occasionally affect adjacent coils in the 
measurement halls. The longer-term expected behaviour of the 
channel activity is also understood, where following an initial 
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Fig. 9 Mean, Median & Standard Deviation of raw counts 
Fig. 10 Heatmap of normalised counts, scaled by monitor, coloured by standard deviations from mean 
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spike in activity level in one channel, the activity level of all 
channels will often increase as escaped fission byproducts 
recirculate in the primary coolant loop. It is also suggested that 
any long term general behaviour of the monitors may prove to 
be useful in identifying anomalies in the data. The incorporation 
of these effects into any future model will be instrumental in the 
feature engineering step identified in Fig. 2. 
6 CONCLUSIONS & FURTHER WORK 
This paper has demonstrated the additional value that can be 
gained from the application of modern data analytic techniques 
to leverage existing data sources and provide additional 
insights into core behaviour, demonstrated through application 
to delayed neutron data. 
 
An initial review of a number of approaches toward improved 
DN analysis have been presented. Early work has proved 
promising in this regard, with some statistical analyses 
potentially able to identify channels containing fuel defects up 
to 2-3 scans earlier than the current system. 
 
Analysis of a larger dataset has enabled longer-term trends in 
the data to be identified, which may identify useful inputs to 
more sophisticated analytics tools. Further datasets will also 
shortly become available and allow analysis of other factors, 
including but not limited to coolant temperatures, fission 
product levels and well-validated channel power simulation 
results. These inputs may allow subtler trends in the DN 
dataset to be isolated and allow more sensitive anomaly 
detection algorithms to be implemented, further reducing the 
time for the localisation of fuel defects. 
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